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 DLD-087        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-3637 
___________ 
 
AEMER K. C. EL, Appearing Jus in Rem Propria Persona Sui Juris, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
LYNN A. WEHLING, in her individual and official capacity in personam;  
GAMALIEL CRUZ, in his individual and official capacity in personam;  
TIMOTHY CODISPOTI, in his individual and official capacity in personam;  
CHOPEK, in his individual and official capacity in personam;  
PATILUCCI, in his individual and official capacity in personam;  
BERNARD, in his individual and official capacity in personam;  
O'NEIL, in his individual and official capacity in personam;  
CARELLA, in his individual and official capacity in personam;  
CAVAGNARO, in his individual and official capacity in personam;  
CERVINI, in his individual and official capacity in personam;  
PAUL SHADLINGER, in his individual and official capacity in personam;  
RAMOS, in his individual and official capacity in personam;  
MOLLIK, in his individual and official capacity in personam;  
CANDELERIO, in his individual and official capacity in personam;  
ROBERT P. BECKER, in his individual and official capacity in personam;  
JOHN A. KASPER, in his individual and official capacity in personam;  
DONNA BUCKMAN, in her individual and official capacity in personam;  
JOHN RILEY, in his individual and official capacity in personam;  
HERNON DENNIS, in his individual and official capacity in personam;  
BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS OF THE COUNTY OF CUMBERLAND, in 
personam; JENNIFER WEBB-MCRAE, in her individual and official capacity personam;  
CITY OF VINELAND; ATTORNEY GENERAL NEW JERSEY, in his or her individual and 
official capacity in personam; STATE OF NEW JERSEY, in personam;  
NJS T.E.A.M.S. UNIT SOUTH 
____________________________________ 
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On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil No. 1-12-cv-07750) 
District Judge:  Honorable Joseph E. Irenas 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
November 27, 2013 
Before:  SMITH, HARDIMAN and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges  
 
(Opinion Filed: December 27, 2013) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Pro se appellant Aemer El appeals from the District Court’s denial of his motion to 
reopen and for leave to file a fourth amended complaint.  For the reasons discussed below, we 
will summarily vacate the District Court’s order and grant El’s motion for summary action.  
See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
I. 
 In December 2012, El filed a 58-page complaint that included a critique of the United 
States’ policy on drugs, several cites to the religious texts of the Moorish Empire, and 
references to a search of his home and his subsequent arrest and prosecution.  In January 2013, 
the District Judge dismissed El’s complaint without prejudice, noting that the complaint failed 
to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) and that he was “unable to tell which of the many counts 
listed in the Complaint pertain to which defendants, or which acts of defendants violated which 
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of Plaintiff’s rights.”  El subsequently filed three motions for leave to amend, which the 
District Court denied because the proposed complaints failed to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2). 
  In August 2013, El filed a motion to reopen and for leave to file a fourth amended 
complaint.  Attached to his motion were three documents: one titled “Amended Complaint,” 
one titled “Statement of Several Claims,” and one titled “Bill of Allegations.”  The District 
Court denied his motion with prejudice, noting that El had again failed to satisfy the 
requirements of Rule 8(a)(2).  This appeal followed.
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II. 
 Rule 8(a)(2) requires a pleading to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim 
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”  A complaint “must contain sufficient factual 
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”  Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 
(2007)).  The allegations “must not be ‘so undeveloped that [the complaint] does not provide a 
defendant the type of notice of claim which is contemplated by [Fed R. Civ. P.] 8.’”  Umland 
v. PLANCO Fin. Servs., Inc., 542 F.3d 59, 64 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Phillips v. Cnty. of 
Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008)). 
 We cannot agree with the District Court that El’s document titled “Amended 
Complaint” does not satisfy the requirements of Rule 8(a)(2).  In this document, El has 
asserted seven claims of malicious prosecution and conspiracy to commit civil rights 
violations.  Each count sets forth the supporting facts and the defendants against whom the 
count is asserted.  A liberal reading of the “Amended Complaint,” see Haines v. Kerner, 404 
                                              
1
 We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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U.S. 519, 520 (1972), reveals that El is also raising claims of unlawful search and seizure and 
illegal arrest.  In sum, El’s document contains “a short and plain statement” of each of his 
claims, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and provides the defendants “the type of notice of claim . . . 
contemplated by Rule 8,” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 233. 
 El required the District Court’s leave to amend because he had already attempted to 
amend three previous times.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).  Under Rule 15(a)(2), courts “should 
freely give leave when justice so requires.”  When considering pro se complaints, courts should 
not deny leave to amend “when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a 
valid claim might be stated.”  Branum v. Clark, 927 F.2d 698, 705 (2d Cir. 1991); see also 
Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1135-36 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting that “a pro se litigant 
bringing a civil rights suit must have an opportunity to amend the complaint to overcome 
deficiencies unless it is clear that they cannot be overcome by amendment).  Here, El’s 
“Amended Complaint” met the requirements of Rule 8(a)(2) and addressed the District Court’s 
previous concern that it was “unable to tell which of the many counts listed in the Complaint 
pertain to which defendants, or which acts of defendants violated which of Plaintiff’s rights.”  
Accordingly, we agree with El that the District Court abused its discretion in denying his 
motion to reopen and for leave to file a fourth amended complaint.  See Connelly v. Steel 
Valley Sch. Dist., 706 F.3d 209, 217 (3d Cir. 2013); Jackson v. Danberg, 656 F.3d 157, 162 
(3d Cir. 2011).  Instead, the District Court should have granted his motion and directed that his 
“Amended Complaint” be filed.  While we express no view as to whether El will eventually 
plead a meritorious claim or whether defenses will be prove to be dispositive, his “Amended 
Complaint” provides adequate notice of his claims.  See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 233. 
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III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we grant El’s motion for summary action and will summarily 
vacate the judgment of the District Court and remand for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.  El’s motion for leave to file a motion for 
summary action in excess of 20 pages is granted; however, his motion for leave to file exhibits 
on a DVD is denied. 
 
 
 
